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By 2015 those who said they had “no religion” when asked about religion on surveys and 
censuses had become an absolute majority in Britain. Drawing on surveys and interviews 
carried out in Great Britain between 2013 and 2015 this lecture offers a portrait of the 
“nones” and attempts to explain their rise to become a cultural majority.   
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The Rise of “No Religion”: attempting an explanation 







The rise of “no religion” has been swift in many formerly-Christian liberal democracies, from 
the USA to Australia. In few places has it happened more decisively than in Britain where 
there is now a “no religion” majority and Christianity finds itself for the first time in second 
place.  
I have documented the rise of “no religion” in more detail elsewhere (Woodhead 
2016a), but will begin this paper with a summary account, not least because I have refined 
my understanding in a number of respects. After profiling the “nones” (those who tick the 
“no religion” box on censuses and surveys) I will make my first serious attempt to explain 
this profound cultural transition. My focus is Britain where I have carried out the most 
extensive research on “no religion”, but I look sideways to other parts of the world as well. 
 
THE NEW NORMAL 
If you attended a funeral in Britain in the 1980s you would have known exactly what 
to expect. It would have been organized by professional undertakers, led by a member of the 
Christian clergy, and taken place in a church or a crematorium. There would have been a 
funeral service with a set liturgical form and hymns would be sung. It would be orderly and 
predictable. Apart from the hymn-singing there would be few demands on you other than to 
show up and wear suitably sombre clothing. Traditionally the service would be followed 
immediately by burial of the body though in the course of the 20
th
 century the growing 
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popularity of cremation broke that link: cremation is now more common in Britain than 
burial. Ashes would be picked up by the family on a later date and might be buried in a 
graveyard or scattered somewhere of the family’s choosing, normally in private.  
Fast forward a few decades to 2015 and things have changed considerably. If you were 
organizing the funeral yourself you would have a great deal more choice. You would 
probably still use an undertaker to arrange it, but you might decide to do it yourself or engage 
a new kind of funeral director, often female, who offers a one-stop shop - literally in a shop 
premises in some cases - with everything done as you want it, including bringing in the sort 
of celebrant you desire (the triumph of retail over ecclesiastical). Even a traditional 
undertaker will now give you a choice of a religious or a secular celebrant, and there are 
many kinds to choose from, from humanist to “green.” You will be asked whether you want 
the ceremony (not “service”) to be celebratory, reflective, sad, humorous, solemn or some 
combination of these. You also have more choice about how the body is disposed of and 
memorialized: where and whether to make a memorial, how to decorate it, and whether it 
should be temporary or permanent. It is also becoming more common to start with a private 
ceremony for disposal of the body followed by a public ceremony to celebrate the life of the 
deceased. In short, almost everything is now up for grabs. 
For the previous fifteen hundred years or so the vast majority of funerals in Britain 
had been Christian. Until recently it was tautological to say “a Christian funeral.” By 2015 
that had changed. When I asked a nationally-representative sample what kind of funeral they 
would like, a quarter said Christian, 36% non-religious, and 23% a mix.
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 The non-religious 
funeral had become completely normal. By “normal” I don’t just mean a matter of numbers - 
the point at which an absolute majority, more than half the population, chose a non-religious 
funeral - I also mean socially, culturally and emotionally normal. I mean the point at which 
people feel perfectly comfortable with something and expect it.  
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As recently as 1990 a non-religious funeral was still unusual. It would usually be 
performed by a humanist celebrant and would be a clear statement that the deceased was an 
atheist and wanted nothing to do with religion. By 2015 it was the Christian funeral which 
had become a bit strange. Fewer people knew when to stand up and when to sit down and 
they didn’t know how to sing the hymns. So the safer option for a bereaved family was to opt 
for a broadly non-religious funeral in which there were a few religious elements for older 
relatives, perhaps a prayer. By 2015 even humanist celebrants were facing stiff competition – 
they were the only ones to retain a commitment to secular atheism, while a plethora of other 
kinds of non-clerical celebrant were happy to allow people to design whatever a sort of 
celebration they wanted. A Christian funeral had become a religious statement, something 
which would exclude as well as include, not just “what everyone does”, but explicitly secular 
funerals had not taken its place. Something more intriguing was happening, something which 
had blurred the traditional categories of social-scientific reflection, the religious and the 
secular.   
 
THE RISE OF “NO RELIGION” 
Because I have been studying religion in Britain for the last quarter century my career as a 
sociologist of religion has coincided with the rise of “no religion.” Between 2007 and 2015 I 
was Director of a national research programme called “Religion and Society” which 
generated a great deal of new, mainly qualitative, data giving fascinating glimpses of  what 
was happening in Britain and abroad.
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 It encouraged me to begin interviewing nones and 
researching funerals and other rituals, and I embarked on an experiment with a professional 
photographer, Liz Hingley, in which we asked people to come to be photographed by her 
with a “spiritual object,” after which I would interview them about their choice. Between 
2013 and 2015 I also carried out a series of large, nationally-representative surveys in Britain 
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in order to gauge the nature and extent of what we were finding in the more in-depth 
empirical work.
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These surveys revealed a remarkably swift growth of “no religion” across Great 
Britain. When I first polled in January 2013 nones represented 41% of the population; by 
December 2015 that had grown to 50%. The numbers told the story and the story was 
confirmed by the British Social Attitudes Survey which has been asking about religion since 
1983. Fig 1 shows the steady growth of “no religion” according to BSA, rising by two-thirds 




Fig 1. Proportion of British people reporting no religion 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 
 1983 1993 2003 2013 
No religion 31.4 36.8 43.4 50.6 
We don’t know exactly when the rise of no religion began. Callum Brown (2017) 
believes it was in the 1960s and that we are dealing with a short, sharp cultural revolution. 
His figures bear this out for Canada and the USA but are less convincing for Britain. Both 
open critique and quiet indifference to religion have a long history in Britain, the country of 
David Hume and Charles Darwin, and it is quite possible that the rise of no religion here has 
been slow and steady over the course of many decades, perhaps for over a century -- but there 
are no surveys against which to check.  
In any case, the high figure today shows that Britain is one of the frontrunners in “no 
religion” amongst formerly-Christian countries. There are two ranks. In Tier One are 
countries where nones are in the majority: the Czech Republic, Estonia, the Netherlands, 
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New Zealand. In Tier Two with “no religion” growing fast and nones already amounting to 
around a quarter of the population are Canada, France, Germany (higher in the east),  
Australia and the USA. In the USA the proportion of nones took off only very recently but 
rocketed to reach a quarter of the population by 2015.
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  Then there are non-Christian 
countries in which there is a “no religion” majority, of which China is by far the largest. Here 
the situation is different from the formerly-Christian countries, with “no religion” being more 
longstanding and not incompatible with a plethora of popular forms of spiritual and ritual 
practice: for historical and political reasons the “religion” category is not applicable here in 
the way it is in Christian-heritage countries.  
The rise of no religion may continue in various parts of the globe, but if the Pew 
Research Foundation’s projections are accurate it is unlikely to take share from the existing 
religions. Although “no religion” is benefitting from more conversions than any religion, 
nones tend to have relatively low fertility rates – so although their total number is projected 
to increase by more than 100m to 1.2bn by 2050 this represents a falling share of the total 





One of the most striking findings of research on the nones in liberal democracies is just how 
indistinct they are from the wider populations in their home countries in many respects. In 
Britain my surveys reveal that they are as likely to be female as male, uneducated as 
educated, and that they come from all social classes and every part of the country. In terms of 
ethnicity, however, the British census categories tell us that they are disproportionately likely 
to be “white British”: 93% compared to 86% of the total population. This doesnt mean that 
“no religion” is exclusive to white Britons: Chinese Britons, for example, are even more 
likely to identify as nones, but there simply aren’t as many Chinese Britons as white ones. 
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Interestingly, people of mixed white/black ethnicity, including mixed white/black Caribbean 
and mixed white/black African, are at least as likely to be nones as are those of white British 
ethnicity, suggesting that the higher level of Christian adherence seen in recently-arrived 
first- and second-generation African migrants and their Pentecostal churches will decline if 
inter-marriage occurs at the high rate it had for previous generations.   
But the most distinguishing mark of the nones is their relative youthfulness. Figure 2 
shows this in detail. If we compare “Christian” and “no religion” there is a striking contrast 
between the youngest cohort (aged 18-24) with around 60% reporting no religion and 30% 
“Christian”, and the oldest (aged 60 and over) where the proportions are reversed. If we 
exclude those belonging to non-Christian faiths, two-thirds of under- 40s now say they have 
no religion.  
 
Figure 2: No religion and religion by age 
Source: Linda Woodhead/YouGov December 2015 
Age cohort No religion Christian  Other religion  
(including those who 
prefer not to state their 
religion) 
No religion as % 
of the population 
(excluding Other 
religion) 
18-24 60% 27% 13% 69% 
25-39 55% 32% 13% 63% 
Under 40s 
aggregated  
56%      31% 13% 65% 
40-59 45% 46% 7% 49% 
60+ 34% 60% 5% 36% 
Over 40s 40% 54% 6% 43% 
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aggregated 
Total 46% 44% 10% 51% 
 
I have factored in “Other” religions besides Christianity (Hinduism, Islam etc.) in Figure 2 
because like “no religion” many of these also have a youthful profile and are growing – 
though unlike “no religion” their growth is mainly due to high inward migration to Britain in 
the post-war period and higher birth rates. Even so, as the fourth column of Figure 2 shows, 
their growing share of religious affiliation has not been enough to counter the rise of “no 
religion”. As the fifth and final column shows, if you are younger being non-religious is the 
norm. 
 
Figure 3: Religious affiliation by age, GB 
Source: Linda Woodhead/YouGov Jan 2014 
 
 








Rel ig ious  af f i l iat ion  
Anglican None Roman Catholic Other
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Figure 3 shows the expansion of no religion relative to different denominations in 
Great Britain. It makes it look as if its rise exactly mirrors the decline of the Church of 
England (Anglican), and although this is partly true (not least because the Church of England 
is and has been since the Reformation the largest single denomination in Britain) it masks the 
fact that the free Protestant churches which were once the CofE’s main rivals have dwindled 
away even faster. The Roman Catholic Church has seen proportionally similar losses as the 
CofE, especially in relation to attendance, but this has been somewhat masked in the case of 
the Roman Catholic Church by more resilient levels of adherence (saying you are Catholic 
even if you don’t go to church or follow Church teachings) and above all by migration to 
Britain from within the EU, particularly of Catholics from eastern Europe (Christians are the 
single largest religious group by migration in post-war Britain, larger even than Muslims who 
now make up at least 5% of the population).  
There is no sign that these trends – the decline of Christianity and the rise of no 
religion – are going to stop. The youthfulness of nones relative to Christians means that 
Christianity is literally dying out whilst “no religion” is burgeoning. It’s tempting to imagine 
that the mechanism of growth is conversion: people question their Christian faith and become 
“none”.  Bullivant (2017) describes this as “nonversion”, and Brown (2017) has conducted a 
series of fascinating interviews with “nonverts” around the world.7  But adult switching is 
actually less important in the rise of “no religion” than children deviating from the religious 
commitments of one or both of their parents. If we analyse the BSA data, which asks a 
question about religion of upbringing, we see that for people who say they were raised 
Christian there is a 45% change they will end up identifying as nones, but for those raised 
with “no religion” there is a 95% probability that they will stay that way. Thus “no religion” 
is currently “sticky” in a way Christianity is not. This of course means that not only are “no 
religion” parents more likely to produce “no religion” children, those children will do the 
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same – so the pool of the non-religious goes on growing, even if their birth rate is not as high 
as that of religious people. The result is that more and more children are raised in Britain with 
little or no first-hand knowledge of the Christian faith.
8
 Many will still have Christian 
grandparents, but in a generation or two even that will have ceased to be true. 
As with demographic characteristics, nones share many attitudes and commitments 
with the rest of the population – the “somes”. The thing which makes them stand out most 
clearly in my surveys is their strong and unvarying commitment to making up their own 
minds. This lies behind their defining refusal to be labelled as religious even if they believe in 
God. Amongst other reasons, they tick the “no religion” box on surveys as a way of clearing 
the ground for a unique identity and refusing to be classed with those who are willing to see 
themselves as examples of a category. 
This liberal spirit - a spirit of independence - is widespread in Britain as a whole. 
When asked how they make up their minds about difficult decisions, the overwhelming 
majority of British people, including many somes, say that they consult their own conscience, 
reason and intuition rather than relying on an external authority. But nones are even more 
likely to say this. Moreover, questioned about concrete moral issues they are more uniformly 
liberal/independent. That doesn’t mean they think “anything goes” -- they may have quite 
strict codes of personal ethics -- but they believe that everyone should be free to decide how 
they want to live their own lives so long as they don’t harm others.  
In 2013 when I carried out a survey asking a series of questions about personal 
morality one of the most controversial topics – on which there was a clear split – was same-
sex marriage which at the time was still being debated in Parliament (it was made lawful in 
Great Britain later that year). The other most controversial topics were assisted dying (illegal 
in Britain) and abortion (legal up to 24 weeks, under certain conditions). On each of these 
three issues nones came down firmly on the liberal side of the debate – that’s to say they 
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were permissive, believing that it should be up to the adults involved to make up their own 
minds what to do and that no-one, including church or state, should dictate. Most somes 
agreed, but significant numbers did not. If we aggregate attitudes towards these three issues 
to construct a liberalism scale,  83% of Britons fall at the extreme liberal/permissive end of 
that scale but 100% of nones.
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  The least likely to be liberal on these issues are British 
Muslims (though a majority are liberal), members of conservative evangelical Christian 
denominations -- and the bishops and official teachings of the Church of England and the 
Roman Catholic Church. Leaving aside their leaders, however, Anglicans as a whole are 
almost as liberal as nones, scoring 92% on the liberalism scale, with lay Catholics not far 
behind.
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  In relation to personal morality Britain is probably one of the most liberal countries 
in the world, the nones are just more so.   
In politics, however, there is not much to separate nones from somes. My surveys find 
them to be spread across the spectrum of (moderate) leftwing to (moderate) rightwing in a 
very similar way to the population as a whole, with under a third being left-leaning, just 
under a third right-leaning, and the rest – a plurality – being centrist in their political 
attitudes. In the US political system a similar sort of positioning translates into nones being 
overwhelmingly Democrat simply because the British Conservative party is much more 
liberal than the Republican party on many issues, including abortion and same-sex marriage 
(the latter was pushed through by a Conservative government).   
Different from the left-wing/right-wing scale, though often illicitly elided, is the scale 
of attitudes to do with being nationally-rooted or more global in outlook -- the “somewheres” 
and “anywheres” as Goodhart (2017) puts it. Plotting nones on such a scale shows that they 
are rather more likely to be global/cosmopolitan in outlook than somes, but that is mainly 
because members of the Church of England in particular are rather strongly national. On 
Brexit, for example, around a half of nones were in favour of leaving compared the European 
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Union compared with two thirds of Anglicans and, as Figure 4 shows, and the difference 
remains even when you take account of age.  
Fig 4 How did you vote in the EU Referendum? By religion  
Source: Linda Woodhead/You Gov, July 2016 
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Percent Leave All CofE None 
All 53% 66% 47% 
Female 57% 68% 50% 
Male 50% 64% 44% 
ABC1 46% 63% 37% 
C2DE 64% 71% 63% 
Under 40 37% 49% 35% 
40 to 59 57% 66% 51% 
Over 60 66% 72% 61% 
London 41% 57% 35% 
 
What about identity: who do nones think they are?  In the normal course of things 
they probably wouldn’t describe themselves as non-religious unless pressed by a survey or by 
someone trying to sell them some kind of religion. Brexit suggests that whilst some think of 
themselves in terms of national identity – Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish, English, British -- 
these identities, particularly Englishness, are generally less important for nones than for their 
mainly Anglican forbears and contemporaries. Obviously nones they don’t think of 
themselves in terms of a religious identity, and they’re not particularly keen to be labelled 
“spiritual” either. When I asked the “spiritual but not religious” question in a form which 
gives a more positive option for those who don’t identify with either “religious” or “spiritual” 
most take it (Figure 5):  
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Fig 5 Neither Spiritual nor Religious 
Source: Woodhead/YouGov 2013 




 Somes  Nones 
A spiritual person 15  8 
A religious person 8  1 
Both spiritual and religious 10  1 
I would not describe myself, or my 





None of these 13  19 
Don’t know 6  3 
 
Nones are resistant to secular as well as religious labels. Only about 2% identify as 
“secular” or “humanist”. “Atheist” is not popular either, even for nones who don’t believe in 
God.  They don’t think this defines them. As Euan, 16, said to me in a “spiritual object” 
interview,  
I’m trying to get into Buddhism. I went to Japan on holiday and was fascinated by the 
temples and I think I’ve always wanted to belong to something but I’m not sure a God 
is right for me. I think more a way of life. I think the kind of peace and kind of… its 
hard to put a finger on it… umm… yeah, just the train of thought that kind of goes 
with it.  
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My surveys show that nones exhibit a range of views about the existence of God or a 
“higher power” (Figure 6).  Over 40% are convinced atheists, with a larger proportion being 
less definite: open-minded, sceptical, undecided, or just “dunno.” About one in twenty are 
firm believers in God. As to what kind of God, most say a personal God, and the rest say 
spirit, life-force, energy, or simply “there is something there”. 
Figure 6 Belief in God or a Higher Power  
Source: Woodhead/YouGov 2013, 2014 
 Nones Somes 
Yes, there is definitely a God or some “higher power” 5.5% 39% 
Yes, there is probably a God or some “higher power” 11% 29% 
No, there is probably NOT a God or some “higher power” 23% 11% 
No, there is definitely NOT a God some “higher power” 41.5% 6% 
Don”t know 18.5% 15% 
 
Most nones are not the doughty secularists which some versions of secularization 
theory expected, but they are certainly more sceptical about the existence of God than those 
who identify as religious – and that scepticism grows with each younger generation of nones. 
When I combined indicators like disbelief in God and hostility to faith schools to find out 
how many nones are strongly anti-religious in the fashion of Richard Dawkins only 13% fit 
the bill. The growth of no religion can’t be conflated with the growth of the sort of secularism 
championed by the so-called new atheists,  atheism has not been growing anything like as 
fast as no religion, and atheism doesn’t share no religion’s youthful age profile.  
As for religious practices, again my surveys reveal diversity. A quarter of nones 
report taking part in some kind of personal religious or spiritual practice in the course of a 
month, like praying. What they absolutely don’t do is take part in communal practices like 
worship, in contrast to American nones who are much more likely to have congregational 
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involvement. British nones are nevertheless rather tolerant of organized religion and its 
leaders though they  take no notice of what they say. In 2015 the only religious leaders they 
expressed much regard for were Desmond Tutu, the Dalai Lama, and to a lesser extent Pope 
Francis.
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 Not surprisingly nones hate being preached at and told what to do; they want to 
think for themselves and make up their own minds. 
EXPLAINING THE RISE OF NO RELIGION 
The rise of “no religion” is unique when compared to other examples of religious 
change in British history because it has happened without leadership or orchestration. It is not 
a social or a political movement, nor is it what Walby (2009) refers to as a cultural “project” 
with many different actors, organizations and waves -- like Protestantism or feminism. 
Certainly there are institutional changes which have played a role in the rise of no religion, 
but it has not grown because people joined a “no religion” movement or followed a 
charismatic leader; it has emerged slowly and gradually as one by one individuals made 
rather personal decisions which led to this outcome. In most cases it is not even an identity 
they have chosen.  
If I have made much of the fact that nones became a majority in Britain in 2015 and 
that even before then “no religion” was becoming the norm – as in funerals – this is not 
because I imagine that future generations will be socialised into “no religion” as once they 
were into religious identities, but because social norms are salient. They have weight and 
momentum. More human life and behaviour has to do with habit than reasoned choice, and 
however much modern liberals may think they are unique individuals they too generally try 
to fit in. Once something becomes the norm it becomes the default position – “just what you 
do” – and you have to opt out rather than opt in. Moreover, once Christianity and 
churchgoing ceased to be the norm and once that social pressure lifted, increasing numbers of 
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people simply stopped going. Given the choice, they opted out. This is further reason why the 
growth of “no religion” is likely to continue.  
As the changing nature of funerals shows, the shift away from “Christian” seems to 
have had more to do with people wanting the freedom to plan them for themselves – and not 
finding or expecting that clergy would accommodate that – than with a strong rejection of 
religion. That people remain open to having religious and non-religious, traditional and non-
traditional elements in a funeral is an indication that “no religion” is characteristically 
undogmatic. Rather than forming an identity in opposition to religion it says: “live and let 
live”. If granny would like a prayer and hymn at the funeral let’s have it, and if fellow 
citizens want to walk round cities in full face veil or in the formal hat and suits of haredim, 
fine, that’s up to them so long as they don’t impose their choices. Nones reject religion 
undogmatically and a large part of what they are rejecting is the dogmatism rather of religion 
rather than religion tout court.  As Gordon, aged 40, said,  
I’m not a fan of organised religion, it has such a bad reputation these days. The basis 
of all religions is the spiritual side. There have just been people who have used it to 
manipulate… A God of your understanding is whatever you want it to be. You don’t 
have to have all these iconic symbols. They say in AA [Alcoholics Anonymous] it can 
be the teapot! 
Clearly then, one of the broader social shifts which lies behind the rise of “no 
religion” and explains its affinity with liberal democracies is the way in which more and 
more people – wave after wave of the previously more marginalized – have come to have 
more voice and choice in the course of the 20
th
 Century, largely as a result of sustained 
campaigns and political efforts. This is what the cultural theorist Raymond Williams 
described as the “long democratic revolution.” In Britain its roots go back well before the 19th 
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Century but it became more widely accepted and mainstream after the 1960s and remains 
unfinished. It has involved more social categories of people being able to acknowledge, 
express and act upon their own desires: black as well as white, women as well as men, queer 
people as well as straight,  disabled as well as able-bodied, young as well as old, laity as well 
as clergy. The cultural and political roots of this long revolution are various and it has been 
institutionalized in many different forms: in mass education and child-centred learning, in the 
expansion of higher education, in universal welfare and healthcare, in human rights and 
equality legislation, in consumerism and democratic arrangements. Though it has not been 
sufficiently noticed in theories of secularization and religious change, I believe it is of 
fundamental importance in understanding the rise of “no religion” – the latter represents one 
aspect of its outworking.  
Having said that, this is not a social trend which led inevitably to the decline of the 
churches and organized religion, and it has not had the same effect in all other liberal 
democracies. In a forthcoming collaborative book comparing the seven historic national 
churches of northern Europe, for example, we highlight the resilience of the Nordic churches 
compared with the British (Woodhead and Iverson 2018). Despite being historically similar 
and located in similar liberal democratic countries undergoing the same sort of long 
revolution, these Churches have not followed the same trajectory. Figure 7 illustrates what I 
mean by comparing the most successful -- the Church of Denmark -- with the rapidly-
declining Church of England. The difference is striking. In part it can be explained by the 
way in which the Church of Denmark has kept in step with the democratic revolution (e.g. in 
relation to women and gay people) whereas the Church of England has done the opposite, 
partly because of the influence of conservative evangelicalism/fundamentalism. As we show 
in a recent book on the decline of the CofE since the 1980s it is not just that the English 
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people became less religious and dogmatic; their national Church became more so (Brown 
and Woodhead 2016).    
Figure 7 Statistical Comparison of the Church of England and the Church of Denmark
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 CofE (2013) CofD (2014) note 
Baptism 12% 64% % live births 
Weddings 20%  34% % all weddings 
Funerals 33%  83% % all funerals 
Average Sunday 
attendance 





2% are members 
(on electoral roll) 
77% (pay church 
tax & are members) 
% of population 
Christmas  4.5% (Xmas eve & 
Xmas day) 
20% (evening only)  % of population 
 
Another social change which has undoubtedly influenced the rise of “no religion” is 
the way in which more people in Britain than ever before are directly confronted by cultural 
and religious diversity.  This is no longer a matter of a distant empire but of the same level of 
diversity at home – for over three generations. In addition, more people than ever before 
travel abroad for work or pleasure and have access to a much greater range of culture and 
relationships by way of old and new media. Britain may have come late to cultural and 
religious diversity compared with many countries outside the West, but since the 1950s it has 
arrived very quickly. In religious terms it is now more diverse that the USA with larger 
proportions of more non-Christian faiths as well as “no religion.”  Moreover, this is an 
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intensified kind of pluralism which is not just about “simple” inter-religious diversity 
(Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus etc), nor even the “twin pluralisms” of which Peter Berger (2014)  
speaks (the religious/secular as well as the inter-religious) but a cultural superdiversity in 
which being a Catholic can mean any number of different things and in which even 
hyphenated identities like Catholic-Buddhist or Jewish-pagan-lesbian or non-religious now 
sound rather old-fashioned (Woodhead 2016b). This does not necessarily lead to a rootless 
individualism, but we see pluralization reflected in the nones’ more cosmopolitan and less 
national attitudes and in their affirmation of diversity as a core value (Madge, Hemming and 
Stenson 2014). Cultural options are broader than ever before and individuals have the 
freedom and resources to explore and construct them. The magnitude of this change can be 
gauged by remembering that even as late as the 1970s there were many parts of Britain in 
which Protestants and Catholics were still suspicious of one another.  
Influential also in the rise of “no religion” are marketization and consumerization. I 
mean, first, the way in which the mode and model of the marketplace has become dominant 
in both imagination and in reality such that spheres of life which were previously outside a 
market logic have been brought within it. And, second, the way in which individuals have 
been turned into both commodities and consumers, such that we increasingly think of how 
well we can “sell ourselves” and we habitually face the world as consumers who have 
choices. This factor cannot be as important as democratization/individualization and 
pluralization in the rise of no religion, for whilst there are few culturally plural liberal 
democracies not experiencing a rise of “no religion” there are many places deeply affected by 
marketization and consumerization which are not as affected. However, in combination – and 
when combined with increasing affluence and consumer power – this appears to be a 
powerful force in reinforcing the cherishing of independence, individuality and diversity 
which is so characteristic of the “no religion” generations.  
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One can also mention the importance of changing beliefs in the rise of “no religion” 
as many traditional secularization theories would do. My interviews with nones in the 
“spiritual object” series suggest that a combination of evolutionary biology and an expanded 
cosmological horizon informed by space-exploration and astro-physics are important in 
shaping younger people’s worldviews (passively at least), and that they often – but not 
always – make traditional belief in a benevolent and omnipotent creator God less plausible. 
However, the effect is less evident for young British Muslims, and is of course not really a 
problem for non-monotheistic religions including many Asian and indigenous traditions. And 
although belief in God - especially believing with certainty - is declining, there are some 
beliefs, including belief in a soul and an afterlife, which are still growing.  Ideologically it 
may well be that the most important long-term influences playing out in “no religion” are a 
combination of liberal Protestantism and Romanticism sifted and reworked in the context of 
democracy, pluralism and consumer capitalism. 
 
CONCLUSION  
“No religion” can easily be criticized as an awkward and misleading term. There is truth in 
this charge, because “no religion” is not a new kind of religion, or a negation, or a merely 
oppositional identity. It’s not a category of exactly the same kind as the “religions” or one 
constructed in simple opposition to them. But on the other hand, the criticism is too sweeping  
because “no religion” also displays aspects of all these things.  
The most important sense in which “no religion” is not a religion is that it is 
dissimilar to any kind of organized religion in Britain today, and deeply unlike the kind of 
modern, missional, non-liberal and confessional forms of Christianity which has become 
increasingly dominant in Britain since the 1980s. It rejects scriptures, leaders, dogma, 
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orthodoxy and higher authority in general. Indeed, its difference from this kind of religion is 
so great that it explains why “no religion” is not constructed in conscious opposition to 
institutional religion, particularly the Churches, in the way the new atheism does or 
“alternative” spirituality used to be (on the constitutive relationship between spirituality and 
Christianity see Woodhead 2011). The nones simply don’t have such religion on their 
horizons. Ironically, church leaders in Britain reference “no religion” more than the nones 
reference them – a clear indication of the reversal of majority/minority status they have 
experienced.  
Yet “no religion” is not a mere negation, a secular subtraction of religion, a normative 
free-for-all or pure cultural diversity. It has some common sacred commitments which lend it 
more than a whiff of religion as viewed through a Durkheimian frame. British nones seem to 
be unified by an ethical stance. This is not orthodoxy or even orthopraxy but a sort of 
“orthoethike” or “autoarete”, for nones prioritize ethics over dogma and freedom over 
belonging.  To repeat what Euan, quoted above, said: “I’m not sure a God is right for me. I 
think more a way of life.” The central commitment of “no religion” is that each and every 
human being should be free to decide how best to live his or her own life even if it involves 
bad choices. In some ways nones are anarchists and libertarians, for they think that everyone 
should be free to live their life in the way they choose (Rock 2014). But although individuals 
have a primary responsibility to make the most of their own lives, they have a subsidiary one 
to help others do the same. Democracy in the broadest sense is taken for granted, diversity is 
embraced as a good in its own right, and some forms of solidarity are valued very highly.  As 
Lucy, aged 31, put it:  
What’s the meaning of life?  I think… it has to be about human connection, and 
understanding, and having compassion, and leave things better than when we found 
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them…And relationships. Finding your own path and being happy with it, and being 
happy with yourself. Yeh [looking at me] – but what about you?  
These core commitments to freedom, diversity and loving-kindness are so broad that 
they can be played out with very different notes and melodies – deeply consumerist ones with 
a lot of conspicuous display at one extreme, or deeply ecological ones with a huge amount of 
commitment to the greater cause at the other. The vast range of acceptable possibilities 
safeguards the freedom and diversity which “no religion” supports. But not everything is 
acceptable. As Durkheim would also expect, there is a boundary which should not be crossed. 
Because the good lies in making the most of your life and helping other people do the same, a 
wasted life or a life cut short is tragic, and the abuse or destruction of another’s life is “evil” 
(a word commonly used in example to terrorist atrocities and other forms of violence, for 
example). This explains why it is only with the rise of “no religion” that sexual abuse and the 
abuse of children in general has been seen as a terrible offence. The sexual predator and the 
terrorist have become no religion’s symbols of ultimate evil. What’s more, it is evident that 
every act of terrorism committed in Britain by Islamists has forced the nones to further 
articulate, symbolize and mobilize around their shared values.
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 As Madge et al (2014) show, 
despite their commitment to tolerance, there are some things nones will not tolerate.   
To end this lecture for the ASR, let me observe that I think it is this ambiguous status 
as both like and unlike religion which explains why the Sociology of Religion has been able 
to take such a leading role in the study of “no religion.” It is not just that “religion” questions 
on surveys and censuses have been the canary in the coalmine alerting us to its growth, but 
that tools forged for the study of religion and religious change have thus far proved helpful 
for interrogating the rise of “no religion.” Insofar as “no religion” is unlike existing forms of 
Western religion, however, these tools are insufficient. This paper with its merely provisional 
account of the rise of “no religion” will no doubt illustrate that. The rise of “no religion” is 
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forcing a serious rethink of the Sociology of Religion, pushing it more firmly into the broader 
realm of culture and values, and offering scholars of religion in countries where the line 
between religion and culture has never been drawn as sharply to correct our ethnocentric 
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invitation to deliver this lecture. Thanks also to Gerardo Marti for his assistance as I was  
preparing this paper for publication in Sociology of Religion and for his patience in waiting 
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 These surveys were designed by myself and administered by YouGov. They were nationally 
representative and had sample sizes of around 4,000 GB adults (not Northern Ireland) aged 
18 and over. They are available at  http://faithdebates.org.uk/research/   I analysed the data 
with the assistance of Professor Bernard Silverman.  
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5
 Figures from various sources, many supplied by researchers from the respective countries at 
a workshop on “No Religion” convened by myself and Detlef Pollak, May 2017, University 
of Muenster. See also Pew, “Global Religious Landscape”, Religious Composition by 
Country http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/12/globalReligion-tables.pdf 
6
 Pew Research Center 2015. “Why People with No Religion are Projected to Decline as a 
Share of the World”s Population” http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/03/why-
people-with-no-religion-are-projected-to-decline-as-a-share-of-the-worlds-population/ 
7
 Brown (2017) deals with adult conversions. 
8
 In the second survey I carried out in 2013 around half the population said they had had no 
contact at all with the Church of England in the past year, even by way of the media.  
9
 Of course, we set the “bar” on the liberalism scale ourselves – the point is to test the relative 
position of different groups.  
10
 In 2013 (before same-sex marriage became legal) 46% of nones supported the current 
abortion law compared with 37% of “somes” (those who identify with a religion),  62% 
thought same-sex marriage was right compared with 37% of somes, and 85% supported a 
liberalisation of the law concerning euthanasia compared with 70% of somes.  
11
 Woodhead/YouGov. Sample Size: 3243 GB adults (aged 18+), Fieldwork: 7th - 11th July 
2016 
12
 Linda Woodhead/YouGov  for the “Tablet” April 2015.  
% having a favourable impression of 
   Nones  All (total population) 
The Dalai Lama 56%   57% 
Desmond Tutu 41%   46% 
Pope Francis  29%   40% 
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13
 Source Denmark: http://www.km.dk/folkekirken/kirkestatistik/ and for church attendance 
Marie Vejrup Nielsen and Hans Raun Iversen (eds.). Tal om kirken. Undersøgelser af 
Folkekirkens aktivitets-og deltagerstatistik. Publikationer fra Det Teologiske Fakultet 57. 
2014. Source UK:  CofE, Statistics for Mission 2013, London: Archbishops” Council, 2014 
https://www.churchofengland.org/media/2112070/2013statisticsformission.pdf 
14
 In fieldwork in Manchester in May 2017 in the weeks after the ISIS suicide-bomber’s 
attack in the Manchester Arena I noted that the main values expressed on cards, floral tributes 
and in public books of condolence included kindness, diversity, love, freedom, enjoyment, 
and a commitment to the city itself and civic ideals. The act of violence was repeatedly 
described as “evil” and people were urged to resist it and not allow it to “win” by overcoming 
it with love and solidarity.  
